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Abstract
This paper studies a two-person trading game in continuous time that gen-
eralizes Garivaltis (2018) to allow for stock prices that both jump and diffuse.
Analogous to Bell and Cover (1988) in discrete time, the players start by choos-
ing fair randomizations of the initial dollar, by exchanging it for a random
wealth whose mean is at most 1. Each player then deposits the resulting cap-
ital into some continuously-rebalanced portfolio that must be adhered to over
[0, t]. We solve the corresponding “investment φ-game,” namely the zero-sum
game with payoff kernel E[φ{W1Vt(b)/(W2Vt(c))}], where Wi is player i’s fair
randomization, Vt(b) is the final wealth that accrues to a one dollar deposit into
the rebalancing rule b, and φ(•) is any increasing function meant to measure
relative performance. We show that the unique saddle point is for both players
to use the (leveraged) Kelly rule for jump diffusions, which is ordinarily defined
by maximizing the asymptotic almost-sure continuously-compounded capital
growth rate. Thus, the Kelly rule for jump diffusions is the correct behavior
for practically anybody who wants to outperform other traders (on any time
frame) with respect to practically any measure of relative performance.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Literature Review
Bell and Cover (1980) studied a static, zero-sum competitive investment game whose
payoff kernel is the probability that Player 1 has more wealth than Player 2 after a
single period’s fluctuation of the stock market. They found it necessary to introduce
the device of “fair randomization” of the initial dollar for a random capital whose
mean is at most 1. This being done, in equilibrium both players use the Kelly (1956)
rule (or log-optimal portfolio) in conjunction with uniform(0,2) randomizations of the
initial dollar.
Kelly (1956) initially found his criterion by considering repeated bets on horse
races by a wire fraudster whose advance knowledge is not 100% reliable. Kelly’s
example, which is beautiful in its simplicity, leads one to recover the logarithm as
the “correct” utility function. As naturally as ever, Kelly considered fixed-fraction
betting schemes and found the one with the highest possible almost-sure asymptotic
capital growth rate. This gave him his “New Interpretation of the Information Rate”
of the wire.
Bell and Cover’s (1988) sequel replaces the probability of outperformance by the
expectation of some arbitrary measure φ(•) of the two gamblers’ relative performance.
They again found that the Kelly rule reigns supreme, along with fair randomizations
that are completely characterized by φ(•). Thus, for practically any egotist whose
only goal is to outperform other traders over the short term (by whatever his personal
criterion), the correct behavior is specified by the Kelly criterion. Well, maybe not
correct for everybody : Samuelson’s (1979) simplified approach to critiquing the Kelly
rule uses only one-syllable words.
Garivaltis (2018) wanted to see whether or not Bell and Cover’s results hold up
in the context of a stochastic differential investment φ-game for several Itoˆ processes
with state-dependent drift and diffusion. They do; the correct behavior is to use Bell
and Cover’s (1988) randomizations Wi[φ] in conjunction with the feedback control
policy b(S, t) := Σ−1[µ(S, t)− r1], which is the local version of the multivariate Kelly
rule in continuous time. Here, µ(S, t) is the local drift vector, Σ(S, t) is the local
covariance matrix of instantaneous returns per unit time, and 1 is a vector of ones.
1.2 Contribution
The present paper extends the analysis of Garivaltis (2018) to a general stock market
where security prices both jump and diffuse, as introduced by Merton (1976). We
define the corresponding leveraged Kelly rule and show that it is the unique saddle
point of the expected ratio of the players’ final wealths. Jumps arrive at an expected
rate of λ per unit time; when the diffusion parameters are zeroed out, we recover
Bell and Cover (1988), albeit with the proviso that the players must twiddle their
thumbs while waiting for jumps to arrive. In this connection, we have extended
Bell and Cover’s analysis to allow for leveraged portfolios in so far as solvency can
be guaranteed for all possible jump realizations x in some compact, arbitrage-free
support Ξ.
2 Investment φ-Game for Jump Diffusions
We consider a two-person trading game in continuous time that generalizes Garivaltis
(2018). A discrete-time version of the game was studied by Bell and Cover (1980,
1988). The game has several moving parts, which we discuss presently. Each player
starts with a dollar.
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Definition 1. By a fair randomization of the initial dollar is a random wealth
W distributed over [0,∞) such that E[W ] ≤ 1.
Example 1. W :∼ uniform(0, 2).
Example 2. W := exp(−σ2/2 + σZ), where Z is a unit normal.
Example 3. W := 1 with certainty.
At the start of the game, each player i ∈ {1, 2} picks a fair randomization Wi.
The money is then deposited into a continuously-rebalanced portfolio over a stock
market with n correlated securities whose prices jump and diffuse. We let Sit denote
the price of stock i, which follows a jump diffusion
dSit
Sit
= µi dt+ σi dWit + (Xi − 1)dNt. (1)
Here, µi and σi are the drift and volatility, respectively, of stock i, and Wit is a
standard Brownian motion. We let ρij := Corr(dWit, dWjt) be the correlation of
the unanticipated (diffusive) instantaneous returns of stocks i and j. We let Σij :=
Cov(dSit/Sit, dSjt/Sjt)/dt = ρijσiσj denote the covariance of instantaneous returns
per unit time. We assume that the matrix Σ := [Σij]n×n is invertible, and therefore
positive definite.
Jumps arrive according to a Poisson process, at an expected rate of λ jumps per
unit time. We let Nt denote the number of jumps that occured over [0, t]. Thus, we
have Nt ∼ poisson(λt) and
dNt =

1 with probabilityλ · dt
0 with probability 1− λ · dt
. (2)
3
The gross-returns on jumps are random vectors X := (X1, ...,Xn)
′, where Xi :=
Si(t+)/Si(t−) is the gross-return on stock i for a jump that occurs at t. We let
xi := Xi − 1 be the net return, and we write x := (x1, ...,xn)′ for the vector of net
returns on a jump. We assume that jumps X are drawn iid according to some CDF
F (•). We assume that all sources of randomness in the game, namely X, Nt, W1,W2,
and (Wit)
n
i=1, are mutually independent.
We allow the players to use leveraged, continuously rebalanced portfolios (or fixed-
fraction betting schemes), denoted b := (b1, ..., bn)
′ ∈ Rn. During diffusion, the
rebalancing rule b trades continuously so as to maintain fixed fractions bi of wealth in
each stock i. We assume that there is a risk-free bond whose price Bt := e
rt follows
dBt/Bt = r · dt. We let Vt(b) denote the wealth at t that accrues to a $1 deposit into
the rebalancing rule b. Thus, the trader owns biVt(b)/Sit shares of stock i at time t.
The remaining (1−∑ni=1 bi)Vt(b) dollars are invested in bonds. While diffusing, there
is no risk of bankruptcy over the differential time interval [t, t + dt], no matter how
much leverage is used. However, in order to avoid bankruptcy after jumps X, there
must be limits on how much leverage each trader can use.
Accordingly, we assume the net return vectors x have a closed and bounded sup-
port, denoted Ξ ⊆ Rn. Limited liability means that Ξ is bounded below by the
vector −1 = (−1, ...,−1)′, e.g. xi ≥ −100%. Ξ generates a corresponding set B of
non-bankruptable (admissible) rebalancing rules, where
B := {b ∈ Rn : 1 + b′x > 0 for allx ∈ Ξ}. (3)
Here 1 + b′x is the gross-return of the rebalancing rule b during a jump. We assume
that no bond interest is received (or paid) during a jump, since no time elapses.
During diffusion, the trader’s margin loan balance is (
∑n
i=1 bi − 1)Vt(b). Thus, he
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maintains a constant debt-to-assets ratio of (
∑n
i=1 bi − 1)/
∑n
i=1 bi.
Proposition 1. The action set B is nonempty, convex, and open.
Proof. First, note that 0 ∈ B. Next, since B = ⋂x∈Ξ{b ∈ Rn : 1 + b′x > 0} is
an intersection of half spaces, it is convex. Finally, define the function m(b) :=
min
x∈Ξ
1 + b′x. By the Theorem of the Minimum (Berge 1963), m(b) is continuous, since
Ξ is compact. Note that m(b) > 0 if and only if b ∈ B. Thus, B = m−1(0,∞) is open,
since it is the preimage of the open set (0,∞) under a continuous mapping.
We will assume that Ξ does not allow arbitrage, in the sense that
max
b∈B
min
x∈Ξ
b′x = 0. (4)
Example 4. The net return support Ξ := [0.01, 0.2] is disallowed, because sup
b∈B
min
x∈Ξ
bx =
+∞. The gambler could take out an arbitrarily large margin loan and earn an infinite,
riskless profit on the first jump that occurs. We have B = (−5,∞) and
m(b) =

1 + 0.01b b ≥ 0
1 + 0.2b b ≤ 0
. (5)
Example 5. For a market with a single stock whose jumps have a net return x ∈
Ξ := [x, x] where x < 0 < x, we have B = (−1/x,−1/x).
The wealth Vt(b) that accrues to a one dollar deposit into b evolves according to
dVt
Vt
=
n∑
i=1
bi
dSit
Sit
+
(
1−
n∑
i=1
bi
)
r ·dt = [r+(µ−r1)′b]dt+
n∑
i=1
biσidWit+b
′x ·dNt, (6)
where 1 := (1, ..., 1)′ is an n×1 vector of ones. The trader’s growth factor from jumps
is
∏Nt
k=1(1 + b
′xk), where xk is the net return vector of the kth jump. Applying Itoˆ’s
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lemma for several diffusions (Wilmott 2001), the trader’s growth factor from diffusion
is exp{[r + (µ− r1)′b− b′Σb/2]t+∑ni=1 biσiWit}. Thus, we have the formula
Vt(b) = exp
{
[r + (µ− r1)′b− b′Σb/2]t+
n∑
i=1
biσiWit
} Nt∏
k=1
(1 + b′xk). (7)
Definition 2. The investment φ-game is the two-person zero-sum game with pay-
off kernel
E
[
φ
{
W1Vt(b)
W2Vt(c)
}]
, (8)
where Player 1 (numerator, maximizing) picks a rebalancing rule b ∈ B and a fair
randomization W1, and Player 2 (denominator, minimizing) picks a rebalancing rule
c ∈ B and a fair randomization W2. φ(•) is any increasing function meant to measure
the relative performance of the two traders.
Example 6. φ(R) := 1[1,∞)(R). This turns the payoff kernel into the probability that
Player 1 has more final wealth than Player 2.
Example 7. φ(R) := 1[α,∞)(R). We get the probability that Player 1 achieves at least
the fraction α of the final wealth of Player 2.
Example 8. φ(R) := Rγ, for γ ≥ 0.
Example 9. φ(R) := R/(R+1). This turns the payoff kernel into E[W1Vt(b)/{W1Vt(b)+
W2Vt(c)}], e.g. the expected ratio of Player 1’s wealth to the aggregate wealth.
3 The Basic Saddle Point
We start by solving the simplified game with payoff kernel E[Vt(b)/Vt(c)]. This will
culminate in
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Theorem 1. max
b∈B
min
c∈B
E[Vt(b)/Vt(c)] = min
c∈B
max
b∈B
E[Vt(b)/Vt(c)] = 1. The maximin
strategy b∗ and the minimax strategy c∗ are both equal to the Kelly rule (log-optimal
continuously-rebalanced portfolio) for jump diffusions.
In preparation for proving the theorem, we explain and define the Kelly rule for
jump diffusions. The trader’s realized continuously-compounded capital growth rate
over [0, t] is
log Vt(b)
t
= r + (µ− r1)′b− b′Σb/2 +
n∑
i=1
biσi
Wit
t
+
Nt
t
·
Nt∑
k=1
log(1 + b′xk)
Nt
, (9)
which converges to Γ(b) := r + (µ− r1)′b− b′Σb/2 + λE[log(1 + b′x)] as t → ∞.
The asymptotic growth rate Γ(b) is strictly concave over B.
Definition 3. The Kelly rule for jump diffusions is the (unique) rebalancing
rule that maximizes the asymptotic continuously-compounded capital growth rate. It
is characterized by the first order condition
b = Σ−1
(
µ− r1 + λE
[
x
1 + b′x
])
. (10)
Next, we calculate that
E[Vt(b)/Vt(c)] =
E
[
exp{(µ− r1)′(b− c)t+ (t/2)(c′Σc− b′Σb) +
n∑
i=1
(bi − ci)σiWit}
]
E
[ Nt∏
k=1
1 + b′xk
1 + c′xk
]
= exp{(µ− r1− Σc)′(b− c)t} exp
{
λt
(
E
[
1 + b′x
1 + c′x
]
− 1
)}
= exp
{(
µ− r1− Σc+ λE
[
x
1 + c′x
])′
(b− c)t
}
. (11)
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Thus, we will work with the simplified payoff kernel
pi(b, c) :=
(
µ− r1− Σc+ λE
[
x
1 + c′x
])′
(b− c) , (12)
which is the compound-growth rate of E[Vt(b)/Vt(c)]. Since pi(b, c) is concave (in
fact, linear) in b and convex in c, the saddle point is characterized by the first-order
condition ∇pi(b, c) = 0. Taking the gradient with respect to b, we get the equation
c∗ = Σ−1
(
µ− r1 + λE
[
x
1 + 〈c∗,x〉
])
. (13)
This is precisely the first-order condition that defines the Kelly rule for jump diffu-
sions. The equation has a unique solution that serves to define c∗. In just a moment,
we will take the gradient of pi(b, c) with respect to c, by using the product rule. To this
end, we let D denote the differential (an n× n matrix) of the mapping c 7→ E[ x
1+c′x
]
of Rn into itself. We have
Dij =
∂
∂cj
E
[
xi
1 + c′x
]
=
∂
∂cj
{
∂
∂ci
E
[
log(1 + c′x)
]}
. (14)
We note that D is negative semi-definite, since it is the Hessian matrix of the concave
function c 7→ E[log(1 + c′x)]. This being done, we apply the product rule and get the
first-order condition
0 = ∇cpi(b, c) = (−Σ + λD)(b− c)− In ·
(
µ− r1− Σc+ λE
[
x
1 + c′x
])
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=∇bpi(b,c)=0
,
(15)
where In is the n× n identity matrix (e.g. the differential of c 7→ c). Now, note that
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the matrix −Σ +λD is negative definite (therefore invertible), since it is the sum of a
negative definite matrix and a negative semi-definite matrix. Thus, from the equation
(−Σ + λD)(b − c) = 0 we obtain b = c. This proves that the unique saddle point is
for both players to use the Kelly rule for jump diffusions, and that the value of the
simplified game (with kernel E[Vt(b)/Vt(c)]) is 1.
4 Solution of the Investment φ-Game
On account of the fact that the unique saddle point of E[Vt(b)/Vt(c)] is to set b∗ and
c∗ equal to the Kelly rule, we have the inequalities
E[Vt(b)/Vt(c∗)] ≤ E[Vt(b∗)/Vt(c∗)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
≤ E[Vt(b∗)/Vt(c)], (16)
which hold for all b, c ∈ B. Thus, when the numerator player uses the Kelly rule it
guarantees that the expected payoff is ≥ 1, and when the denominator player uses
the Kelly rule it guarantees that the expected payoff is ≤ 1. With these guarantees in
mind, we proceed to solve the general investment φ-game. First, we need a definition.
Definition 4. For any increasing function φ(•), the “primitive φ-game,” with
value v[φ], is the two-person, zero-sum game with payoff kernel E[φ(W1/W2)], where
player 1 chooses a fair randomization W1 and player 2 chooses a fair randomiza-
tion W2. The value of the primitive φ-game is v[φ] = sup
W1
inf
W2
E[φ(W1/W2)] =
inf
W2
sup
W1
E[φ(W1/W2)]. The random wealths W1 and W2 are independent of each
other.
Theorem 2. The investment φ-game has the same value v[φ] as the primitive φ-
game. In equilibrium, both players use the Kelly rule for jump diffusions, and the
players use the same fair randomizations (W∗1,W
∗
2) that solve the primitive φ-game.
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Proof. The proof given in Garivaltis (2018) carries over to the more general case of
several jump diffusions. We start by showing that E
[
φ{W∗1Vt(b∗)/(W2Vt(c))}
] ≥ v[φ]
for any fair randomization W2 and any rebalancing rule c ∈ B, where b∗ is the Kelly
rule. Note that W2Vt(c)/Vt(b
∗) ≥ 0 is a fair randomization, since E[Vt(c)/Vt(b∗)] ≤ 1.
Thus, since W∗1, is Player 1’s maximin strategy in the primitive φ-game, we have
E
[
φ{W∗1Vt(b∗)/(W2Vt(c))}
] ≥ v[φ].
Similarly, we show that E
[
φ{W1Vt(b)/(W∗2Vt(c∗))}
] ≤ v[φ] for any fair random-
ization W1 and any rebalancing rule b ∈ B, where c∗ is the Kelly rule. Note
that W1Vt(b)/Vt(c
∗) ≥ 0 is a fair randomization, since E[Vt(b)/Vt(c∗)] ≤ 1. Thus,
since W∗2, is Player 2’s minimax strategy in the primitive φ-game, we must have
E
[
φ{W1Vt(b)/(W∗2Vt(c∗))}
] ≤ v[φ].
Thus, we have shown that (W∗1, b
∗) guarantees that the expected payoff is ≥ v[φ]
and (W∗2, c
∗) guarantees that the expected payoff is ≤ v[φ] when b∗ and c∗ are equal
to the Kelly rule and (W∗1,W
∗
2) are the equilibrium strategies from the primitive
φ-game. This proves the theorem.
5 Examples
To close the paper, we simulate some gameplay for a market with a single stock that
diffuses according to the parameters ν := 0.07, σ := 0.15, and µ = ν+σ2/2 = 0.08125.
We assume a risk-free rate of r := 0.03, and that jumps arrive at an expected rate
of λ := 1 per year. On jumps, the gross-returns X will be distributed according to
“Shannon’s Demon” (Poundstone 2010), e.g.
X :=

2 with probability 1/2
1/2 with probability 1/2
, (17)
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meaning that the stock price either doubles or gets cut in half, each with equal
probability. If one could anticipate these jumps, then the growth-optimal policy
would be to put b := 0.5 the instant before each jump, achieving long-run capital
growth of 6% per jump. During diffusion (before and after the jumps), the correct
policy would be to set b := (µ− r)/σ2 = 2.27, achieving a growth rate of 8.8% a year,
for a total of 14.8% annually. In our game, however, the jumps are unanticipated; the
rule b := 2.27 goes bankrupt just as soon as x · dNt = −50%. In fact, B = (−1, 2).
The Kelly rule for jump diffusions is b := 0.585, for a yield of 11.3% per year. The
saddle is plotted in Figure 1. We compare this to the sub-optimal behavior of two
other players: a player who uses c := 1 (buy and hold) and a daring player who uses
d := 1.1. A sample path for T := 300 years is plotted in Figure 3. A (different) sample
path for T := 10 years is shown in Figure 4.
Let Ut denote the number of times the stock jumps upward over the interval [0, t],
where Nt − Ut is the number of times it jumps downward. We let P (n, u, t; b, c) :=
Prob{Vt(b) > Vt(c)|Nt = n, Ut = u}. Then we have
Prob{Vt(b) > Vt(c)} = e−λt
∞∑
n=0
n∑
u=0
(λt/2)n
u!(n− u)!P (n, u, t; b, c), (18)
where, for b 6= c,
P (n, u, t; b, c) = Φ
(
u log(1+b
1+c
) + (n− u) log(2−b
2−c) + [γ(b)− γ(c)]t
σ|b− c|√t
)
, (19)
where Φ(•) is the cumulative normal distribution function and γ(b) := r+ (µ− r)b−
σ2b2/2 denotes the growth rate of b during diffusion. The outperformance probabilities
for this particular experiment (b∗ = 0.585, c = 1, d = 1.1) are plotted in Figure 2 for
0 ≤ t ≤ 300.
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Figure 1: Payoff kernel 100 · pi(b, c) for the parameters ν := 0.07, σ :=
0.15, r := 0.03, λ := 1, b := 0.585, c := 1, d := 1.1,x ∈ {+100%,−50%}. The
saddle point is b∗ = c∗ = 0.585.
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Figure 2: Outperformance probabilities over different game lengths
t ∈ [0, 300] for the parameters ν := 0.07, σ := 0.15, r := 0.03, λ := 1, b :=
0.585, c := 1, d := 1.1,x ∈ {+100%,−50%}.
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Figure 3: A sample path in the large. ν := 0.07, σ := 0.15, r := 0.03, λ :=
1, b := 0.585, c := 1, d := 1.1,x ∈ {+100%,−50%}, T := 300.
Figure 4: A (different) sample path in the small. ν := 0.07, σ := 0.15, r :=
0.03, λ := 1, b := 0.585, c := 1, d := 1.1,x ∈ {+100%,−50%}, T := 10.
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6 Conclusion
This paper formulated and solved a two person trading game in continuous time that
generalizes Garivaltis (2018) to the case of several jump diffusions. Following a train
of thought initiated by Bell and Cover (1980, 1988), we solved a leveraged “investment
φ-game” where the object is to outperform the other investor with respect to some
more or less arbitrary criterion φ(•) of relative performance.
At the start of the game, each player makes a “fair randomization” of the initial
dollar by exchanging it for a random wealth whose mean is at most 1. Each player
then deposits the resulting capital into some continuously-rebalanced portfolio (or
fixed-fraction betting scheme) that is adhered to over a fixed interval of time. We
showed that the unique saddle point of the expected final wealth ratio is for both
players to use the Kelly rule for jump diffusions, in conjunction with appropriate fair
randomizations that are completely determined by the criterion φ(•).
From time immemorial (Kelly 1956) the Kelly rule has been defined by maximizing
the almost sure asymptotic continuously-compounded growth rate of one’s bankroll.
However, the above analysis shows that, even for an egotist whose sole objective is to
outperform his peers over very short time periods, the Kelly rule for jump diffusions is
the correct behavior. On the one hand, although the investor knows the distribution
of jump returns, he cannot anticipate their exact arrival times. Thus, his only recourse
is to build a portfolio that is continuously ready to perform well when the lightning
strikes. On the other hand, he wants a trading strategy that performs well during
purely diffusive movements of security prices. The Kelly rule is the sweet spot that
perfectly balances these two concerns.
Thus, the present paper constitutes a direct generalization of both Bell and Cover
(1988) and Garivaltis (2018). If the expected jump arrival rate is zero, we specialize to
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Garivaltis (2018). If the diffusion parameters are zeroed out, then we get a leveraged
version of Bell and Cover’s original (1988) game-theoretic optimal portfolios, albeit
with the proviso that the players must watch the paint dry as they wait for jumps to
arrive. If everything is zeroed out, then we get the “primitive φ-game” of choosing
fair randomizations Wi that constitute a saddle point of E[φ(W1/W2)].
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